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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNT~-:;c. ,._ ... __ ._... _._ . _'_ '_"~
STATE OF GEORGIA
~
IN OFfiCE!

I

ALLEN FREEMAN, BARBARA)
FREEMAN, NELDA FREEMAN, and
)
LOIS MEISER V. V I S I O N )

APR -; 2009

.
, OEPOiYClERKSUPERIORCOURi -

!J=_'?"fq~ION COUNTY. GA,

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)
v.
)
)
)
VISION FINANCIAL, LP,
TRADESTATION SECURITIES, INC., )
)
MF GLOBAL INC., f/k/a MAN
)
FINANCIAL INC., ANTHONY
MICHAEL RAMUNNO, JR.,
)
individually and d/b/a RENAISSANCE )
ASSET MANAGEMENT, RAM I, LLC, )
RENAISSANCE ASSET
)
MANAGEMENT, LLC, and WILLIAM )
STACY WILKINSON
)
)
)
Defendants,
)
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Civil Action File No. 2007CV138599

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
On March 16, 2009, counsel for the parties appeared to present oral argument on Motions
to Dismiss filed by Vision Financial Markets, LLC ("Vision"), TradeStation Securities, Inc.
("TradeStation"), and MF Global, Inc. ("MF," collectively the "FCM Defendants"). After
reviewing the Complaint, the briefs submitted on the Motions, and the oral arguments presented
by counsel, the Court finds as follows:

I. FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
Defendant Michael Ramunno, Jr.l is currently incarcerated for operating fraudulent
investment schemes. Mr. Ramunno created isolated investments for and managed an
unregistered commodity pool which he operated as a Ponzi scheme using new investments to pay
"returns". In addition, Defendant Ramunno allegedly perpetrated his scheme by circulating
Defendant Michael Ramunno Jr., was served with the Complaint on August 16,2007. He has
not filed an Answer with the Court.
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fictitious monthly account statements, 2004 and 2005 Annual Reports with fake "audited"
financial statements, and a Private Placement Memorandum ("PPM") in 2005 with false return
summaries and account descriptions.
Plaintiffs,2 along with many other individuals not named in this lawsuit, invested their
money with Defendant Ramunno. Defendant Ramunno perpetrated his scheme through three
entities created and controlled by him: Renaissance Asset Management ("Asset Management"),3
Renaissance Asset Management LLC ("Renaissance"),4 and RAM I, LLC ("RAM").s
Defendant William Stacy Wilkinson, a licensed securities and commodities broker, worked with
Ramunno as an officer and owner of Renaissance and RAM.
In September, 2008, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name three futures commodity
merchants as Defendants: Vision,6 TradeStation,7 and MF.8 Plaintiffs bring five counts against
the FCM Defendants: (1) fraud/conspiracy to defraud, (2) constructive fraud and negligent

2 Plaintiffs Allen and Barbara Freeman invested the following amounts with Ramunno: $450,000
in July, 2004; $135,000 in November, 2004; and $700,000 in November, 2005. Plaintiff Nelda
Freeman, mother to Allen Freeman, invested the following amounts with Ramunno: $200,000 in
November, 2004. Plaintiff Lois Meiser, mother to Barbara Freeman, invested the following
amounts with Ramunno: $40,000 in February, 2005.
3 Asset Management was an unregistered and unlicensed commodity pool operator and trading
advisor that operated from 2003-2005 accepting cash from investors, including Plaintiffs. Asset
Management was operated as a sole proprietorship.
4 Renaissance is a Georgia limited liability company created in 2005. In July, 2005, Renaissance
submitted a registration application with the Nations Futures Association ("NF A") and became a
registered commodity pool operator and trading advisor.
S RAM is Delaware limited liability company created in 2005.
6 Ramunno/Asset Management opened an account in 2003 with Vision as Ramunno d/b/a
Renaissance Asset Management.
7 Ramunno/Asset Management opened an account with Trade Station in May, 2004 under the
name "Renaissance Asset Management." In opening the account, Ramunno filled out an account
application (attached to the TradeStation Answer) stating that Ramunno was self-employed and
asserting that all funds are/will be "personal funds" and none are or were to be solicited from a
third party.
8 Ramunno submitted an account application in 2005 with MF and attached a copy of the PPM.
Unlike with the other FCM Defendants, at the time that Ramunno opened the MF account,
Renaissance/RAM was a properly registered commodity pool.
2

misrepresentation, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty,
and (5) negligence. Plaintiffs allege that the FMC Defendants failed to investigate
Ramunno/Renaissance when opening and maintaining the accounts and should have discovered
that the commodity pool was unregistered from 2003-2005 and that it was engaged in fraudulent
activity. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the FCM Defendants failed to segregate funds in the
accounts.

II.

STANDARD
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b )(6), the Court must

determine whether plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under this
standard, the Court must grant the motion if"(l) the allegations of the complaint disclose with
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts
asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly
introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the
relief sought." Stendahl v. Cobb Cty., 284 Ga. 525, 525 (2008).

III.

ARGUMENTS
A. Duty Owed by FCM Defendants to Plaintiffs
The FCM Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were not their customers, and therefore, they

did not owe Plaintiffs any duty for purposes of establishing fraud through omission, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, or negligence. The FCM Defendants assert that
Plaintiffs were customers ofRamunno, that Ramunno was a customer of the FCM Defendants,
but that there was no customer relationship between the FCM Defendants and Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs argue that they are the beneficial owners of the pooled accounts, and therefore,
are "customers" ofthe FCM Defendants. Plaintiffs rely upon case law interpreting the definition
of "customers" in the context of compulsory arbitration with securities brokers under NASD
3

rules, which holds that a "customer" is not limited to account holders ofFCM defendants. See
~,

WMA Securities, Inc. v. Wynn, 191 F.R.D. 128, 130 (S.D. OH 1999) ("A Customer is

defined as anyone who is not a broker or dealer. 'Customer' is not [solely] defined ... as a person
who opened an account with a brokerage firm). The cases cited by Plaintiffs, however, are
inapplicable because in each case cited, the non-account holder who was found to be a
"customer" had contact with and, at a minimum, an "informal business relationship" with a
registered representative ofthe defendant securities broker. See, e.g., Multi-Financial Securities
Corp. v. King, 386 F.3d 1364, 1368-71 (lIth Cir. 2004) (holding that an investor who relied
upon firm's registered representative and firm's reputation is a "customer" pursuant to NASD
rules); Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 1995); Vextax
Securities Corp. v. McWood, 116 F. Supp.2d 865,869-870 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Vextax Securities
Corp. v. Skillman, 117 F. Supp.2d 654,657 (N.D. OH 2000); WMA Securities Inc. v. Ruppert,
80 F. Supp.2d. 786 (S.D. OH 1999).
Here, the NASD rules are not applicable. In addition, Plaintiffs have not alleged any
communication, contact, or any other fact giving rise to a customer relationship, whether formal
(i.e., an account) or informal (i.e., investment advice), between them and the FCM Defendants.
Therefore, Plaintiffs' reliance on NASD rules and case law interpreting a broker's fiduciary
duties owed to its customers is misplaced. It is undisputed that brokers owe specific duties to
customers such as a care and loyalty, but there is no allegation in the Complaint sufficient to
impute such a duty on the FCM Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs.
Even if the FCM Defendants owed no fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs argue that the
FCM Defendants had a duty under Section 4(d)(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"),
and the accompanying CFTC regulations, to account separately for all of Plaintiffs' funds and
not to commingle or pool such funds. The commodity pool is the "customer" under Section
4

4(d)(2), not the individual investors. The FCM Defendants were under no duty to account to the
individual investors participating in the pool; rather, it was the duty of the commodity pool
operator to provide such an accounting. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d, 6n(4).
Finally, Plaintiffs rely upon common law principles of agency to establish a duty owed to
them by the FCM Defendants. See e.g., Webb v. Day, 273 Ga. App. 491, 492 (2005) ("Agency
is the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." );
O.e.G.A. § 23-2-58 ("Any relationship shall be deemed confidential ... where one party is so
situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another
.... "). The Complaint in this case, however, is devoid of any allegation that the FCM Defendants
exerted control over Plaintiffs or the non-discretionary accounts that Ramunno opened with the
FCM Defendants on behalf of the Plaintiffs.
In all of the theories advanced and cases relied upon by Plaintiffs, there is a connection
between the brokerage firm and the investors to whom a duty arises. That crucial link is missing
in this case. The facts of this case are analogous to the facts of Kolbeck v. LIT America, Inc.,
923 F. Supp. 557,563 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) where the plaintiffs brought negligence, fraud, and
breach of fiduciary duty claims against futures commodity merchants who opened accounts for
an unregistered commodity pool into which plaintiffs had invested. The Kolbeck court
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint finding that the futures commodity merchant defendants owed no
duty to plaintiffs. "Securities brokers do not owe a general duty of care or disclosure to the
public simply because they are market professionals. A duty of care arises only when the broker
does business with the plaintiffs." Id. at 572. The defendants in Kolbeck gave monthly tours of
the New York Futures trading floors to potential investors in the unregistered pool, including the
plaintiffs in the case. The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments that those tours were sufficient to
5

create a confidential relationship or a duty between the parties. Id. at 561. Here, Plaintiffs have
not alleged a single instance of contact or communication between them and the FCM
Defendants. Without facts to support the claim that the FCM Defendants "did business" with
Plaintiffs, there is no basis upon which to find that the FCM Defendants owed a duty to
Plaintiffs. See also, Damato v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 878 F. Supp. 1156, 11581162 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (dismissing claims against FCM defendants because liability under the
CEA only extends to those who sold investments in the commodity pool and similarly dismissing
fraud claims); Brown v. Royce Brokerage, Inc., 632 F.2d 652 (5 th Cir. 1980) (dismissing fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence claims against FCM defendants because there is no duty
to investigate registration status and because plaintiffs were not "customers" of the FCM).
As a matter oflaw, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not customers of the FCM
Defendants, and therefore, the FCM Defendants owed no duties to Plaintiffs.
The absence of a duty owed to Plaintiffs by the FCM Defendants necessitates dismissal
of the fraud by fraudulent omission claim in Count I, constructive fraud and negligent
misrepresentation claims in Count II, breach of fiduciary duty claim in Count III, and negligence
claims in Count v. See, Ades v. Werther, 256 Ga. App. 8, 11 (2002) (fraud); O.C.G.A. § 23-251 (constructive fraud); Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., 267 Ga.
424,426 (1997) (negligent misrepresentation); Perry Golf Course Dev. LLC v. Housing
Authority of City of Atlanta, 294 Ga. App. 387,393 (2008) (breach of fiduciary duty); Bradley
Center v. Wessner. 250 Ga. 199,200 (1982) (negligence).

B. Conspiracy to Defraud
Plaintiffs allege that the FCM Defendants participated in a conspiracy to defraud
Plaintiffs. In order to demonstrate a conspiracy, Plaintiffs must show that the FCM Defendants
acted in concert with Ramunno and Wilkerson to "accomplish an unlawful end or to accomplish
6

a lawful end by unlawful means." First Federal Sav. Bank v. Hart, 185 Ga. App. 304,
305 (1987). The Complaint alleges that the FCM Defendants knew or were extremely reckless
in not knowing that Asset Management was an unregistered commodity pool operator,9 that
Ramunno, Wilkinson, the Asset Management/Renaissance entities made false statements to
investors, and that the PPM contained false and fraudulent misrepresentations. Taking Plaintiffs'
allegations as true, there is nothing in the Complaint, however, to sustain allegations that the
FCM Defendants acted in concert with Ramunno, Wilkinson, or the Asset
Management/Renaissance entities in order to defraud Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs merely allege
knowledge, which is not conspiracy. Having previously held that the FCM Defendants had no
duty to disclose information, conspiracy to defraud must also be dismissed in the absence of
factual allegations to support the existence of such a conspiracy.

c. Aiding and Abetting
Plaintiffs allege that the FCM Defendants aided and abetted Defendant Ramunno's
breach of his fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs. To establish a claim of aiding and abetting, one
must show that "(1) through improper action or wrongful conduct and without privilege, the
defendant acted to procure a breach of the primary wrongdoer's fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; (2)
with knowledge that the primary wrongdoer owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty, the defendant
acted purposely and with malice and the intent to injure; (3) the defendant's wrongful conduct
procured a breach of the primary wrongdoer's fiduciary duty; and (4) the defendant's tortious
conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff." Insight Technology, Inc. v. FreightCheck,
LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19,25-26 (2006) (citations omitted). Count IV of the Complaint closely
follows the language of Insight in alleging aiding and abetting. The language of the Complaint
9 This claim in inapplicable to Defendant MF Global, Inc., because Asset
Management/Renaissance was registered at the time that Rarnunno opened an account with this
Defendant.
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states that the FCM Defendants acted purposefully and with malice and the intent to injure, but
the Complaint is devoid of any allegation to support such a legal conclusion. "While the
complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it must contain more than a formulaic
recitation ofthe elements of a legal cause of action." Charles H. Wesley Educ. Foundation, Inc.
v. State Election Bd., 282 Ga. 707, 714 (2007); see also, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986) (on a motion to dismiss, a court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation"). Without a factual allegation of malice or intent to injure, the Court
must dismiss Plaintiffs' claim of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. See Kolbeck v.
LIT America, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) affd 153 F.3d 918 (2d Cir. 1998)
(affirming dismissal ofFCM defendants on aiding and abetting claims).

D. Punitive Damages & Attorneys Fees
Without the underlying counts in this action, Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages and
attorneys' fees must also be dismissed.

IV.

CONCLUSION
The Court hereby GRANTS the FCM Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and ORDERS that

they be dismissed with prejUdice.

SO ORDERED this

,;2~y

of April, 2009.

ETH E. LONG, SENIOR
Superi r Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

E
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Coples to:
Attornc:ys for Plaintiffs
Jason R. Doss, Esq.
Joy L. Doss, Esq.
The Doss Firm
P.O. Box 965669
Marietta, Georgia 30066
770/578-1314
jasondoss@dossfinn.com.
joydoss@dossfirm.com

Attorn~s for Defendants
Vision Financial LP
Steven Dubner, Esq.
Higgins & Dubner
3333 Peachtree Road, NE
Suite 230
Atlanta, Georgia 30326
404/264-1011
sdubncr@higdub.com

Kenneth F. Berg
Ulmer & Berne ILP
One N. Franklin, Suite 1825
Chicago, IL 60606
(312) 324-8006
kberg@ulmer.com

MF Global Inc.
Harold T. Daniel, Jr., Esq.
Kelli S. Lott, Esq.
Holland & Knight LLP
One Atlantic Center, Suite 2000
1201 West Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 30309
404/817-8500
harold.danicl@hklaw.co111
kclli.lott@hklaw.com
Of counsel
Therese M. Doherty, Esq.
Herrick Feinstein LLP
2 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10016

TradeStation Securities Inc.
Jeffrey W. Willis, Esq.
Rogers & Hardin LLP
2700 International Tower, Peachtree Center
229 Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 30303
404/522-4700
j\villis@rh-law.com
William G. Leonard, Esq.
Taylor, English Duma, LLP
1600 Parkwood Circle, Suite 200
Atlanta, GA 30339
(678) 336-7162
bleonard@taylor-busch.com
Anthony Michael Ramunno,Jr.
Federal Correctional Institute Ashland
P.O. Box 6001
Ashland, Kentucky, 41105
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